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DIEN BIEN PHU
Prelude to battle By the
end of 1953, the Viet Minh had rebuilt their forces and were even
stronger than before. They could now field six infantry divisions, and a
heavy artillery division (the 351st). Many of The cannoneers had been
trained in China, and almost all the infantry were fighting veterans. In
fact, large numbers of Chinese and Russian instructors were within
Vietnam preparing Ho’s soldiers for war. They were now better armed,
better trained and highly motivated. Their stoic, Spartan lifestyle
could not be successfully imitated by the French troops. The
French government failed to grasp the seriousness of the developing
situation. The military and the politicians continually underestimated
the Viet Minh, and took the task of defeating them half-heartedly.
Unrest in Algeria and political upheaval in France itself caused the
struggle in Indochina to take a lesser place of importance in the list
of commitments. In
1953, new leadership entered the arena of battle. It was now realized
that some drastic, decisive action was necessary or an enemy that
refused to quit was slowly but surely bleeding them to death. General
Henri Navarre, now in his 55th year, took the reins of the fighting in
Indochina. He served in the intelligence arm of the resistance and later
took command of a Spahi Regiment chasing Germany out of France. He also
participated in the invasion of Germany and gained fame with his triumph
in the fighting at Karlsruhe. Navarre
would be flanked by experienced commanders. They included Major General
Rene Cogny, his deputy commander, and his “golden boy” Colonel Christian
Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries. It would later be de Castries'
mission to head up the forces at Dien Bien Phu.
Other
commanders with varying degrees of combat capabilities also came to the
light. One was Maurice “Bruno” Bigeard. He never had visions of military
service, but was a deadly foe as a saboteur against the Germans. He
accepted a commission and later was involved in the training of
Montagnards and commanding paratroopers. To the men, he was the
“l’esprit para.” He enjoyed a special charisma with his men, and almost
never carried a weapon, relying upon those who served under him to do
their job. Other
spectacular French commanders included Pierre Langlais, a daredevil of a
fighter and in his third tour in Vietnam. Finally, one-armed Brigadier
General Charles Piroth, who had lost his limb in fighting in World War
II, was purported to be the best artillery commander in the French army.
He would command the guns at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre
envisioned a special type of confrontation to force the Viet Minh into
the open. A new concept was evolving. It was that of an air-land base,
or airhead. It consisted of strongly defended and interconnecting
hedgehog positions in an area directly in the middle of enemy territory.
Once
established, usually by parachuting troops and engineers, it would be
maintained by airdrop. All supplies and reinforcements would be either
be flown in or dropped into the airhead. Its purpose would be that of
constant threat to the enemy's supply lines and rear areas. Furthermore,
if the enemy sought to dislodge them, the strong fortress like defenses
would be impenetrable, and the enemy would expend its assets in trying
to destroy it.
It was
tried in October 1952 in Na Son. There native soldiers and French
legionnaires withstood weeks of siege and human wave assaults. The Viet
Minh were defeated, and the French themselves finally removed the
airhead, because it was located in an area that would no longer
effectively hinder the enemy. General Navarre, recently appointed the
new commander in Chief in Indochina, was aware of these events and
immediately sought an area that would be more advantageous for this
enterprise. The
area selected was a valley located over 300 miles from French
headquarters and near the Laotian border. The village of Dien Bien Phu
was the junction of three highways, and by establishing an airhead
there, the Viet Minh would be deprived of a prime resupply and
reinforcement route from Laos. Such an airhead could provide not only a
threat to the supply lines, but could also serve as a jumping off spot
for offensive action against the enemy.
Though
discussed, no clear-cut decision was ever made by France either for or
against this venture. Once again, vacillation on the part of the French
leadership would prove decisive to actions in Indochina. Navarre
strongly believed in the concept and was determined to see it
accomplished.
Operation Castor Begins
On Nov.20th, 1953, a lone C-47 lazily circled the Dien Bien Phu valley. Within its body the plane carried some of the top military of the French Indochina Army. The most important to the event was Brig. Gen. Jean Gilles, commander of airborne forces, Indochina. The aircraft also contained pathfinders for a large force of paratroopers standing by some 300 miles to the southeast, in Hanoi. Below
Vietminh troops of the 920th Battalion watched the airplane as it
circled. They had little time to gaze, as they were undergoing field
training and their officers barked orders tersely to them. The officers
also looked up, viewed the plane, recognized the silhouette and paid no
further attention. It was not an attack craft and therefore no reason
for concern.
The fog was clearing and the sun began burning off the haze. General Gilles sent an immediate dispatch to Hanoi. “Fog dissipating.” Within an hour, the first C-47s of an air armada of sixty-five rolled down the runways of Bach-Mai and Gia-Lam airfields and headed towards Dien Bien Phu. The attack was on! The
flights of C-47s flew in formations of three, rolling gently up and down
in the morning winds. By 10:30 they were over the landing site,
codenamed “Natasha.” The paratroopers were standing now, chin straps
tightly drawn, and immediately complied with the order to “hook up.” A
strong chilly wind whipped through the open cargo door as the
jumpmasters moved into position. Though a routine often executed by many
of these paratroopers, it never lost its moment of panic and thrill.
Suddenly the loud buzzing of the jump signal cut through the roar of the
wind and the engines. “Go!” The first para leaped from the yawning door
into space. “Go! Go! Go!” cried the jumpmasters and the paras fell from
the aircraft as if tied together, one after the other. Chutes blossomed
and the Vietminh troops below stood dumbfounded as the sky literally
filled with enemy soldiers. It only lasted a moment, however, cut sharply by fearful angry cries of the officers. Soon ragged rifle and machine gun fire attempted to zero in on the descending French troopers. There were some killed and wounded in the air, but it was too little and too late. In a sharp firefight, the French succeeded in chasing off the frightened Vietminh, killing dozens of them and establishing themselves as the new owners of the valley The first units into the valley were the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion, the best French troops in Indochina. 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of Parachute Light Infantry, quickly followed them. These were followed by airborne artillerymen and engineers. The original officer appointed to command the fortress was replaced by Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries. He was a cavalryman and seemed to personify the spirit of mobility desired for the new airhead. Even as the landings were taking place, certain leaders, such as General Cogny, questioned the feasibility of the operation. General Cogny warned that even such a formidable force as the one being formed in the valley could conceivably be imprisoned there, and have little chance for escape or survival. Such observations were ignored, however, by General Navarre, who was convinced of the efficiency of the operation. He listened, but felt strongly committed to the effort and would not call it off.Once on the ground and having taken control of the valley, the French immediately began work on the landing field near the village. It was the first priority. As soon as it was opened, supplies for the construction of defensive positions poured in by the ton. A Battle is Found
Toward the end of 1953, intelligence became aware of mass movements on the part of the Viet Minh toward Dien Bien Phu. Instead of alarming General Navarre, he delighted in the news, feeling that just such a confrontation was desired. No longer would he be chasing a shadowy figure, but a gunfight in the street was pending. He believed he had both the firepower and manpower to win a decisive victory and cripple the Viet Minh severely. Navarre
did not warn the troops in the valley of this information, because he
did not see the need to alarm them. Because of this ignorance, progress
at Dien Bien Phu moved at a snail's pace. After all, what was the hurry?
Except for occasional sniping, the enemy was conspicuously absent.
The
5,000 men in Dien Bien Phu at that point were given two competing
missions. First, one half of its strength was to mount offensive
operations with the purpose of inflicting casualties and interdicting
any proposed encirclement of the fortress. The second was to strengthen
the defenses around the larger airfield so as to allow it's free use.
It
would mean a defensive perimeter of five miles around the airfield. This
translates to a circular area of about 31 miles. An effective defense
would include 36 battalions, but only six battalions were located in the
valley. Thus, they were given impossible tasks from the beginning.
Vegetation was cleared from around the strongpoints, and bunkers were begun. A strong defense would require 36,000 tons of materials, but only a little over 2,000 tons were available. It would be impossible to airlift almost 34,000 tons of building supplies into the area in time to do any good. The brass finally decided that permanent fortifications were not necessary, since the primary purpose of the bastion was offensive, not defensive. The original plan for installation of 10 battalions was also scrapped, due to urgent manpower needs in other areas of Indochina. A great deal was accomplished, however, including the building of roads, bridges, aircraft revetments, bunkers, and the installation of various minefields. The valley's defensive positions were divided into North, Central, and South.
Strong Points and Weak
Points
The
north defence included Gabrielle, Anne-Marie and Beatrice center
included Huguette, Francoise, Claudine, Dominique, and Eliane. Finally
some 10 kilometers to the South, the small fortresses of Isabelle and
Wieme were constructed. Thus 10 strongpoints, all with the names of
supposed ex-girl friends of some high ranking officer were established
and prepared for battle.
Anticipating the strong attacks from the Viet Minh, France's artillery
arsenal was almost drained to strengthen Dien Bien Phu. In addition to
the big guns (six batteries of 105mm Guns, and one battery of 155mm
howitzers), three heavy mortar companies were inserted to provide
plunging fire against enemy entrenchments. Four
quad-fifties were also set up at strategic points of fire. They had
gained fame in neutralizing the Chinese human wave attacks in Korea. All
artillery was the charge of Colonel Piroth, the deputy commander of Dien
Bien Phu. When offered even more artillery, he arrogantly stated that he
already had more artillery than he needed! To
further bolster the defenses, ten disassembled M-24 Tanks were flown in
and put together at the fortress. They were organized into 3 platoons.
The "Bisons", as they came to be known, were to become some of the most
effective weapons in the defense of the garrison. Early Recon in Force
operations proved to be extremely hazardous and costly, and were quickly
curtailed to preserve manpower and supplies. To the
North, another airhead was disbanded and some 20 Tai light infantry
companies were ordered to march overland to various other bases,
including Dien Bien Phu. They were attacked enroute, and a rescue column
from Dien Bien Phu was sent out to meet with them. After fighting to the
designated meeting point, rescuers found that the Tai infantry had been
massacred. The return proved also to be costly in casualties. The Siege Begins
On
January 31st, shelling of Dien Bien Phu began by communist artillerymen.
The Viet Minh had accomplished what no one thought possible. They had
transported over 200 artillery pieces of above 57mm Caliber into the
hills surrounding the French, including numerous batteries of the
Katyusha rocket launchers. Due to a shortage of personnel, the French
had contented themselves with securing the valley floor, and not
patrolling the deeply forested hills around them. The tragedy was to be
that the French would lose more men to artillery attacks than to
infantry weapons. By the
beginning of the second week of March, the Vietminh had dug over 100
kilometers of trenches around the northern strongpoints of Gabrielle,
Beatrice and Anne Marie. As Giap's men dug, the French artillery and
mortars pounded them. An occasional flat report of a French sniper rifle
signaled the untimely demise of some “Boi Doi” who inadvertently raised
his head above the edge of the parapet. Even so, shovels of dirt
constantly flew out of the diggings. The Viet Minh would not be stopped. At this
point the French had about 13,000 troops in Dien Bien Phu, 6,500 of them
being front line soldiers. Four Communist divisions surrounded them.
They numbered nearly 50,000 men. The French were now outnumbered 5 to 1.
Military strategists estimate that the attacker needs a 3 to 1
superiority in order to take its objective. In addition, Giap had
mustered 288 larger guns to the 88 guns of Dien Bien Phu. Giap’s
initial strikes would fall on the northern most French positions. They
were Him Lan or “Beatrice”; Doc Lap, or “Gabrielle”; and Ban Keo,
“Anne-Marie.” The communist force facing the Legionnaires, Algerians,
and Tais vastly outnumbered them. With growing concern, Major Pegot,
commander of Beatrice watched the enemy growing nearer. He and his
troops could see the enemy battalions forming for the attack in the
nearby hills.
He still had confidence in the interlocking protection of the northern arm of the French stronghold. The three positions protected one another with great fields of interlocking fire. With its well-built bunkers, ideally placed machine guns positions, strategically placed land mines and thousands of yards of barbed wire, plus the artillery support and air power on standby, Beatrice seemed impregnable. On
March 13th, the sound of what might have been thunder rumbled across the
surrounding hills. It almost made one anticipate one of those early wet
monsoons as it breaks upon the valley. It was, however, not torrents of
water that fell, but tons of enemy shells that began hungrily devouring
the carefully constructed French defenses. In
seconds, Beatrice was buried under an avalanche of enemy artillery and
mortar fire. Giap’s guns issued a tremendous volley on the Legion
positions. The entire strongpoint seemed to disappear in the smoke and
flame that engulfed it. A massive barrage blanketed the central and
northern fortresses, destroying aircraft and buildings. Large and small
chunks of structures, bunkers and other materials, occasionally
accompanied by ripped-off body parts hurtled in the air in all
directions. Major
Pegot and most of the staff of the 13th Demi-Brigade were killed when
the command post was utterly destroyed by a direct hit. All radio
communication from Beatrice ceased. The Legionnaires were suddenly
isolated from the rest of the garrison by a wall of steel. In addition,
the 3/13 Foreign Legion Half Brigade was understrength that evening (450
men instead of 517).
Barrages also rained down on “DBP Airport.” By 4:00PM the airfield was
closed, thus sealing off Dien Bien Phu from the outside world. It would
be on this day that General Navarre began consulting with his aides as
to the viability of a withdrawal from Dien Bien Phu. By then, however,
it was far too late.
Meanwhile the defenders at Beatrice hung on for dear life as the shells
rained upon them. The acrid smell of cordite, and the sickening stench
of bowels torn from dismembered bodies (a smell rarely mentioned in
combat narratives) thickened the dust-filled air even more. It was the
smell of death, either there or on the way. Now the
human wave assaults began. The Boi Doi leaped from the trenches and ran
toward the Legionnaire emplacements. The “volunteers of death” preceded
them. These were sappers, armed with homemade bangalore torpedoes,
lengths of bamboo pole filled with explosives, designed to rip away
barbed wire in the path of the onrushing troops. Others carried
explosive charges to plant next to bunkers or to hurl into defending
trenches. The shock effect of their charge was startling, but the
defenders recovered quickly.
General Tran Do of the 312th VM division recalled the first soldier out of the trenches. He was Nguyen Huu Oanh. When two signal flares went up to begin the assault, Oanh was ready. He carried a VM flag on his back. He leaped from his position and charged through the wire into an enemy communication trench. He then tossed a grenade into the trench to clear it. From there he machine- gunned a loophole in a bunker silencing it. Twisting and dodging, he managed to get atop the blockhouse and hoist the flag. A ragged cheer ensued from the troops following. The flag was a good omen to them, and their charge gather momentum. The
fighting went on for two hours, then a lull ensued. A truce of sorts
allowed both sides to recover the dead and wounded and to prepare for
the next deadly round. After an hour and a half of some quiet, the Viet
Minh initiated a new charge. Though
hit hard, the Legionnaires rallied to the moment. A well-placed .50
caliber machine gun cut a huge swath in the charging enemy ranks. It
caused enormous casualties. The Vietminh reacted swiftly and brought up
a recoilless rifle team, which took it out with one shot. By now the
fighting was hand to hand, vicious and bloody. By now it was night, but the fighting continued unabated. With all that they had suffered by now, a lesser unit would have broken and fled. But this was the Legion. This was the same unit historically that had fought Rommel to a standstill at Bir Hacheim during the struggle around Gazala. They would continue the legend. The
Legionnaires would fight to the death. And they did. One by one, the
radios on Beatrice went dead. The last message from the strongpoint was
by a radio operator of the Ninth Company. He called in artillery fire
from the French batteries on the command bunker and himself. Then there
was total silence. Beatrice had fallen. The first of De Castries’ ladies
had been slain.
A few of the legionnaires survived retreated to other strongpoints. By now, Viet Minh artillery fire had destroyed the F-8F Bearcat fighters at Dien Bien Phu, so no local air support was available. At this point, all supplies were being airdropped to the units in the valley. About 12 tons were being brought in daily, which was one-fifth of what was needed for the troops to survive. Deadly anti-aircraft fire continued to decimate incoming flights. By the battle's end, the French lost 62 aircraft, and had 167 damaged. March 14: The 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion commanded by Capt, later Major, Botella held in reserve in the delta were parachuted in as reinforcements during the battle and sufferd losses soon after their arrival. The
next victim was Gabrielle. The attack came at the evening, instead of
human wave assaults that were used on Beatrice, the Viet Minh sought to
overcome the defenders with massive artillery fire and infiltration.
When machines guns from the northern bunkers stopped the attackers cold,
one People's Army gunner dragged a 75mm wheeled bazooka to within 150
yards of the emplacement, scored three hits on it, and left it
demolished, smoking and eerily silent. That and a direct hit on the
command post, wiping out the leaders, sealed the fate of Gabrielle. Over
2,000 Viet Minh were killed in these assaults, and brought a pause in
the battle. The
French had also suffered heavily. Losing one tank, over 500 crack
Algerians, an entire heavy mortar company, the defenders were stunned
with the ferocity of the attacks, and numbed by the incessant shelling.
General Piroth, shaken by the inability of his beloved artillery to
counter the Viet-Minh fire, committed suicide, and Col. Keller, Chief of
Staff for the fortress had a nervous breakdown and had to be relieved.
Over 500 Vietnamese troops proved to be absolutely worthless in battle
and were stripped of all rank and authority, and made coolies. Further,
an entire Tai rifle company Anne-Marie quietly deserted into the hills. Keeping Hope Alive
March
16: The arrival of a crack battalion, the the 6th Colonial
Parachute Battalion (Major Bigeard) by parachute into Dien Bien Phu was
a real lift to their morale. March
22: Elements of the 35th Airborne Light Artillery Regement
jumped in as reinforcements. Daytimes landings are now impossible. Still
some nights landings are made. March
26: Last medical evacuation took place. The plane was damaged and could
not take off. A Woman’s Air France nurse, Genevive de Galard was on
board. She remained at Diem Bien Phu and her devotion to duty and
courage were admired by all. March
28: A feeble offensive effort was made by De Castries to relieve some of
the pressure of the anti- aircraft guns. Following a short, intensive,
rolling artillery barrage, tanks and a few battalions moved into the
hills around Claudine and effectively destroyed five 20mm guns, various
machine guns. French losses 20 killed including 2 officers and 76
wounded including 5 officers. Viet Minh losses, 350 killed and about
1000 wounded. The
French were unable, however, to capitalize on their victory, because
they had to abandon the positions. Within a few weeks, those weapons and
men had been replaced and the AA fire intensified in the area again.
The steady digging of approaching trenchworks marked the assault on Dominique and Eliane. Suddenly on March 30, another torrential outburst of artillery against the two French strongpoints was followed by wave after wave of screaming infantry. The 4th Colonial gunners depressed the barrels of their weapons and fired point-blank into the massed Do-Boi. This, with a rain of bullets from the quad fifties caused the Viet Minh to retreat blindly into a recently laid minefield. An entire division, however, overran Eliane. Though efforts to regain these important positions were attempted with combined infantry-armor assaults, they proved largely fruitless, as the French no longer possessed the manpower to hold them. Now
from the West, Huguette was the next lady to be assaulted. One attack
after another against the French created huge amounts of casualties for
them. The medical station was completely overwhelmed. Over 1,000
casualties were consigned to hastily constructed trenches, with little
shelter, light, water or food. There was none to be had. The stench of
the medical facility wafted over the compound, and not surprisingly,
many walking wounded preferred to return to their units, than endure
such conditions. April 2: The 2/1 Colonial Parachute Reg. And elements of the Airborne light artillery Reg. Arrive by parachute. Frontal attacks for several days attacks almost all the strongpoints. April
6: The Viet needs reinforcemants and slows down the tempo of massive
attacks. April
9-11: The 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion was dropped
and made possible counter attacks. Monsoon rain arrives.
The end is near
On the
French side the 4306 replacements parachuted in between March 14 and May
6 did not make up for the losses suffered between those dates (1500
killed and more then 4000 wounded). Among the replacements were 709 non
jump-qualified men who volunteered to fight in Dien Bien Phu after April
20, often jumping at night. Many were Vietnamese who volunteered to join
their comrades in the besieged garrison. By now
anything coming into the fortress was by airdrop, and that was becoming
increasingly difficult, since more AA guns ringed the valley.
The
French became so desperate that private pilots and crews from the
American-operated Civil Air Transport Company were paid to make the
supply drops. Many stated that the intensity of the anti-aircraft fire
was greater than anything seen in World War II or Korea, and would
remain unequalled until Vietnam. During
the siege, a strange phenomenon occurred. Over 2,000 Tai, Algerian,
Moroccan, and Vietnamese deserted, but since there was no escape, they
moved into the very center of the stronghold near the river, and became
known as "The Rats of Nam Yum." The
communist General Giap was forced now to bring in reinforcements from
all over Indochina. His attackers had been so depleted from French
resistance that he had to scrounge from every corner of the country.
It is
ironic to note that if the French had pulled out of Dien Bien Phu in
late December, they would have left most of the People's Army lodged in
a distant and isolated valley in an obscure comer of Vietnam. Now the
very best of France's army was being slowly annihilated.
A
growing surge of rebellion in the communist ranks prevented Giap from
pursuing his assaults. Ammunition was low, casualties were high, and
medical supplies for the many wounded were inadequate. Reinforcement and
resupply were the top priorities for the Communist forces in April,
although sporadic attacks and firing continued throughout the month.
At the end of April, the fortress of Dien Bien Phu had been reduced dramatically. Now the French held parts of Huguette, Dominique and a couple of highpoints in Eliane. Active combatant troops numbered about 2,000, many of whom were wounded. Most suffered from various illnesses and malnutrition. The hospitals and aid stations at Dien Bien Phu are overfull. Wounded lays in the mud. Several wounded continued to serve automatic weapons from firing positions in the trenches. Haggard, worn, and exhausted from lack of rest due to incessant shelling, they were a pitiful remnant of some of France's best soldiers. A few artillery pieces were still operational, and only one tank was in running order. At Isabelle, the southern and isolated strongpoint, about 1,000 men were crowded into an area of about one-fourth of a square mile. The only discipline remaining for the allied units was that of survival, and that light shone dimly for them. By now, the AA guns had been moved into the valley in positions previously occupied by the French, and resupply was literally impossible. General De Castries still believed that the arrival of a relief column, or a cease-fire might set them free. All that was needed, he stated was 12 hours of relative quiet. That was not to be.
The final assult
May
1st, Labor Day, and an important Communist holiday, was the beginning of
the final push by the Viet Minh. May 4: Stalins organs (Katyusha) rocket artillery appeared on the scene. There shattering explosions occurring in series caused enormous damage. The roar of attacking guns, and the swooshing, smashing sounds of the Katyusha rockets deafened the defenders. Close behind the artillery, swarms of Communist soldiers ran against French bunkers and strongholds. Wave after wave was beaten back, often in the heat of close combat. May 6: Clear skies allowed massive air attack. The largest supply drop in eight days follows, but to late. A large drop lands outside the small French area and Vieth Minh gathered it in. Later in the afternoon the Viet Minh answers by firing with all their weapons. The camp was in flames; bunkers collapsed and trenches were flattened in clouds of dirt. 2100 hours: The general attack begins. French also fires with all remaining they have left. Men
used their hands as weapons, striking, clawing, and cursing. Couples lay
together in an embrace of death. The smoke was insufferable. And still
they came. There was no end to them. One assault was beaten back, and
then another leaped over the dead bodies to attack again. Fighting
continues throughout the night. Resistance is fierce and acts of heroism
abound. Eliane 2 is blown up with a charge of 1 ton of TNT placed in a
mine shaft which extended 50 yards under the French defenses. May 7: At dawn, trenches are filled with the dead and wounded of both sides. Dominique and Eliane have fallen. At 0700 hours the Viet Minh regroup for a new and probably final assault. Colonel de Castries, who had just been promoted to general, receives a final message from General Cogny in Hanoi “The firing has to die of its own. You mustn’t mess up what you have done, no surrender, no white flag!.” De Castries gave the order to destroy all equipment and cease fire order to take effect at 1700 hours. Diem Bien Phu sends it’s final message to Hanoi: “We’re blowing up everything, Adieu.” A few minutes later the Viet Minh burst into the central command. Dien Bien Phu has fallen but has not surrendered.
Meanwhile, at Isabelle 6km to the south the fighting goes on. Viet Minh
artillery is pounding Isabelle for several more hours. Lt. Col. Lalande
hesitates to attempt operation Albatross, an attempt to break out to the
south with the remaining troops fit for combat and try to join up with
friendly forces. The sortie is attempted during the night of May7-8. It
almost succeeds. Most of the units involved in the attempt are
intercepted. Still few individuals succeed in breaking through the Viet
Minh lines and reaching French outposts after an exhausting weeks long
march through a hostile Viet Minh infested jungle. At 0100
hours, Isabelle ceases firing. Dien Bien Phu no longer exists.
The Aftermath
By the
next morning, units from the 308th "Iron Division" occupied De Castries'
command bunker. A few hundred troops from Isabelle managed to escape the
night before. All remaining allied troops were now prisoners of the Viet
Minh. Though not badly treated at first, the survivors were ordered to prisoner of war camps some 300 hundred miles away. They were interspersed among the Viet-Minh columns to prevent the French from bombing them. Only 2,000 of the nearly 7,000 French soldiers were to survive the ordeal of the march and the prison camps. The rest joined the 3,000 French soldiers and airmen who had given their lives in the defense of Dien Bien Phu. The battle reinforced some basic truths in warfare. Static defenses, no matter how well constructed, are a "sitting target."
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